THE MEAT

The Ukraine war two years on: It isn’t just about Ukraine

On the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the statistics look grim. More than 300,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded, 10 million Ukrainians (nearly 25% of its entire population) have been displaced, 18% of Ukraine's territory remains occupied, and nearly $250bn in direct military and financial aid has been sent to Ukraine. But the war’s impact isn’t restricted to the aforementioned nations. The global economy endured wild swings in key commodities prices, experienced runaway inflation, and has seen significant recalibration of alliances. From NATO’s rapid expansion in the Nordics to the Wagner Group’s entrenchment in Africa, the war is no longer just about Ukraine. It is also about Africa, West Africa’s regional stability, and the future of continental cooperation. This note explains. 

In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian state relied significantly on the Wagner Group, a private military company founded and led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of the Russian president popularly called Putin’s chef. The group’s tactics relied on sending massive human waves of attacks, often prisoners who were promised freedom if they survived on the field for six months. Notwithstanding the high casualty rates, the tactic recorded modest successes across multiple fronts, including Bankhmut. The group’s successes, often instead of regular Russian troops, cemented its reputation for ruthlessness and getting the job done. This in turn raised its profile across many parts of Africa. 

Wagner, Africa, and the regional blocs 

From Mozambique, through the Central Africa Republic, to Sudan and Sahelian countries in West Africa, the Wagner Group has emerged as a willing partner to authoritarian governments, a key player in civil wars, and an alleged partner to new coup states. Nowhere is this more visible than in Sudan and recent developments in West Africa. The Sudan war, now in its second year, has claimed more than 12,000 lives and displaced more than 5.4 million people. And the war continues. The Wagner Group has been accused by US intelligence groups of strongly supporting the opposition RSF forces with weapons, military advisers, and mercenary fighters. The RSF’s resilience and rapid gains against the national military, in addition to the aforementioned gains in other theaters, has made the Wagner Group a prized partner to many state and non-state actors on the continent, including several West African countries. Mali, Niger Republic, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, all led by coupists, have either signed agreements with the group or expressed strong willingness to do so. 

The rapid rise of the Wagner Group in Africa has in turn spurred a moment of truth for regional blocs and the regional powers on whom these groups are anchored. These include Nigeria with ECOWAS, South Africa with SADC, Kenya with the EAC, and other hitherto influential players on the continent. The recent dramatic events in West Africa is a case in point. From threatening military intervention, through instilling punishing sanctions, to withdrawing all sanctions and suing for peace, ECOWAS is facing a credible threat to its authority and influence, a threat that risks reducing the regional body, and its Nigerian anchor, to a shadow of itself. The bloc now faces the unpalatable choice between taking a strong stance (which risks pushing new coup states into Russia’s hands) and taking a conciliatory stance (which reduces the cost of coups across the region). It’s a Hobson’s choice. And there seems to be no clear way out of the morass; one that threatens the single economic corridor of ECOWAS and could impact the viability of the African single market (AfCFTA) on a continent where seemingly any country could be one event away from a coup and/or civil war. 

Where do we go from here?

Since Prigozhin’s death, the Wagner Group has been rebranded, at least in Name. However, its African division, now christened The Africa Corps, is hardly different. It continues its expansion across the continent, taking advantage of, even fomenting, instability among state and non-state actors. Beyond its threat to the political influence of countries and blocs, it could be a key impediment to the base level of stability and predictability required for realizing the economic potentials of regional blocs and the much anticipated African Continental Free Trade bloc. The visible vacillation of the African Union and regional blocs bodes terribly for the continent and regions. Continued failure to take a clear stance against the group and similar players risks unleashing an epidemic of instability unrivaled in the continent’s history. Africa might not be Ukraine today. However, the seeds are being sown. 

The Kwakol Research continues to monitor developments and opportunities across the continent. Speak to us today!